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Case Number 338,2015

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOSHUA STEPHENSON,	)	
	)	
Defendant-Below,	)	
Appellant	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 338, 2015
	)	
STATE OF DELAWARE,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff-Below,	)	
Appellee	)	

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE'S ANSWERING BRIEF

Maria T. Knoll, ID# 3425
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DATE: March 21, 2016

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NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On December 25, 2012, Wilmington Police arrested Joshua Stephenson ("Stephenson"). He was subsequently charged by indictment with Murder First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, ("PFDCF"), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited ("PFBPP") and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. A1 at D.I. 1, 3.

On March 20, 2014, Dr. Susan Rushing MD, JD, a psychiatrist, prepared a report regarding Stephenson's "Defenses to Criminal Liability". A22, A31-43. On May 20, 2014, the State filed a Motion to Preclude Dr. Rushing's testimony. A6 at D.I. 32. On May, 21, 2014, Stephenson responded. A6 at D.I. 35. On June 9, 2014, Superior Court held a hearing on that and other motions. A7 at D.I. 42. On June 17, 2014, Superior Court orally granted the State's motion to preclude Dr. Rushing's testimony and on June 20, 2014, the court issued a formal written opinion. A8 at D.I. 47, A73-86.

Prior to trial, Superior Court severed the charge of PFBPP. A10 at D.I. 59. Stephenson's jury trial began on January 6, 2015. After the State rested, Stephenson moved for a judgment of acquittal. B28-32. Superior Court denied the motion on all charges except Assault Third Degree, for which it reserved decision. B32. On January 12, 2015, Superior Court found there was insufficient evidence

of Assault Third degree and, at the State's request, submitted the amended charge of Offensive Touching to the jury. B31-32.

After the jury retired for deliberations, Superior Court, in a bench ruling, found Stephenson guilty of PFBPP. B36. On January 13, 2015, the jury found Stephenson guilty of Murder Second Degree (as a lesser included offense of Murder First Degree), PFDCF and Endangering the Welfare of a Child, and not guilty of Offensive Touching. A13 at D.I.71.

On June 17, 2015, Superior Court sentenced Stephenson to life in prison for the charge of Murder Second Degree and imposed and addition twenty-six years, suspended after 15 years for decreasing levels of supervision for the remaining offenses. *See* Ex. A.

Stephenson has appealed. This is the State's Answering Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. DENIED. Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stephenson's request to present expert psychiatric witness testimony and provide a justification jury instruction. As Superior Court properly concluded, Dr. Rushing's testimony would not assist the trier of fact. Dr. Rushing found no connection between Stephenson's psychiatric illness and his decision to kill Ashley. Instead, Dr. Rushing offered the inadmissible lay opinion that Stephenson's explanation, not his psychiatric condition, might justify his actions. In addition, Stephenson offered no credible evidence supporting his request for a justification instruction. Stephenson presented no evidence of self-defense at all but offered only on speculation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Around 5:00 p.m. on December 24, 2012, Ruth Ann Stephenson returned to her home to 1203 West 2nd Street in the City of Wilmington after working two shifts as a medical assistant. A88-89, 92. Her boyfriend, Myron Ashley, Sr., was home, relaxing in basketball shorts and a t-shirt, with their six year old son, nicknamed "Man-Man". A88-89. When Ruth Ann arrived home, Ashley told her that her brother, Joshua Stephenson, had called and that she should call him back. A88-89. Ruth Ann called Stephenson who asked if he could come over. A89. Ruth Ann said yes. A89.

Before Stephenson arrived, Ruth and Ashley ate dinner and lied down on the couch and watched videos while their son ate and played in the living room. A89. As Ruth started to go upstairs to give Man-Man a bath, Stephenson arrived. A89. Ruth stayed downstairs for awhile and talked with him. A89. After about a half-hour, around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., Ruth went upstairs to give her son a bath. A89, 93. At the time, Ashley was lying on the couch in front of the television and Stephenson was sitting on the smaller loveseat. A89.

Because she was tired from work, while Man-Man was in the bath, Ruth Ann lied down and immediately fell asleep. A90, 92. She awoke to the sound of two gunshots. A90. Ruth ran downstairs. A90. Man-Man, who also heard a gunshot, followed behind her. A90; B10. Ruth Ann and Man-Man saw Ashley

lying on the floor and Stephenson was in the room with him, Ruth said he was sitting on the loveseat. A90, 94-95; B11-12. As Ruth Ann ran into the room, Stephenson stood up. A90. Ruth grabbed him and asked "What did you do?" A94-95. Stephenson punched her in the face and left. A90.

Ruth checked for Ashley's pulse and called 911. A90-91. The Wilmington Police Department received the call at 9:53 p.m. Medical aid was dispatched and police officer immediately responded. B1. When Officer Deanne Warner arrived, paramedics were already on the scene rendering aid to Ashley. Off. Warner saw a handgun on the loveseat.

The police recovered a bullet from the carpeted entryway area of the home. B4. The police also recovered two .45 caliber shell casings from the floor next to the larger black sofa, where Ashley had been lying on the floor and two shell casings from on top of that sofa. B5-6. The police determined that one of the bullets traveled through the sofa and into the wall and another one passed through the sofa, through the floor and into the basement. B5-7. The police were unable to remove the bullet from the wall and did not find the one in the basement. B7.

The handgun Stephenson left on the loveseat was a black .45 caliber Llama that had one live bullet in the chamber and one live bullet in the magazine. B6, 8-9. Delaware State Police Forensic Firearms Examiner Carl Rone determined that the four casings found at the scene were ejected from that firearm. B27. However,

because there were insufficient markings on the recovered bullet, Rone was unable to determine if it was fired from the gun. B25-26.

A pathologist determined that Ashley was killed by two gunshot wounds. B13, 16. The first bullet entered Ashley's right arm, immediately exited and reentered his right armpit and traveled through his chest cavity, perforating his right lung, his left lung and exiting his torso. B13-14. The second bullet entered Ashley's left shoulder entered his left arm and exited through back of his arm. B14. In addition, the pathologist concluded Ashley was shot from at least two feet away; his body had no other injuries, nor did he have any drugs or alcohol in his system. B15-16.

At the time of the homicide, Stephenson had been living in his grandparents' basement at 3203 N. VanBuren Street in the City of Wilmington. At 5:00 a.m. on December 25, 2015, the police took Stephenson into custody at that lociation and executed a search warrant of his room, seizing the leather jacket, boots and hat he had worn when he killed Ashley. B19-20. Forensic testing established that Ashley's blood was on Stephenson's leather jacket as well as on money that was inside this jacket. B17. Stephenson's DNA as well as the DNA of at least two other people, not Ruth Ann or Ashley, was on the handgun. B18. Stephenson also had gunshot residue on his hands. B22-24. Stephenson did not have any injuries on him when he was taken into custody. B21.

ARGUMENT

I. SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY DENIED STEPHENSON'S REQUEST FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION AND FOR A JUSTIFICATION INSTRUCTION

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Superior Court properly denied Stephenson's request to present expert witness testimony and to provide a justification jury instruction?

STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court's ruling restricting the testimony of an expert witness for an abuse of discretion[1] and reviews the denial of a defendant's request for a jury instruction *de novo*.[2]

MERITS

Stephenson argues that Superior Court erred by not permitting him to introduce expert psychiatric testimony relevant to his defense of justification and supporting his contention that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense. Stephenson further argues that Superior Court erroneously denied his request for a

[1] *Bush v. HMO of Delaware, Inc.*, 702 A.2d 921, 923 (Del. 1997); *Pinkett v. Brittingham*, 567 A.2d 858, 860 (Del. 1989).
[2] *Gutierrez v. State*, 842 A.2d 650, 651 (Del. 2004), *citing Lunnon v. State*, 710 A.2d 197, 199 (Del.1998).

justification instruction. Superior Court properly exercised its discretion by excluding the irrelevant testimony of Dr. Rushing. Absent any credible evidence – or really any evidence at all – Superior Court correctly declined to instruct the jury on justification.

Expert Testimony

Dr. Susan Rushing, the psychiatrist retained by the defense to provide a psychiatric evaluation of Stephenson, opined in her March 20, 2014 report that Stephenson's psychiatric illness is "unlikely to be relevant" to a justification defense. A42. Nonetheless, Dr. Rushing concluded that, Stephenson's accounts of what caused him to kill Ashley could support a justification defense. A42-43. In short, Dr. Rushing found no connection between Stephenson's psychiatric illness and his decision to kill Ashley. Rather, Dr. Rushing concluded, Stephenson's explanation, not his psychiatric condition, might justify his actions. This secondary, potential explanation was not reached through an application of training and experience and, as such constituted inadmissible lay opinion.[3] A42-43.

The State sought and obtained an order precluding Dr. Rushing's testimony as it related to the issue of self-defense. A21-30. The State argued that: 1) Dr. Rushing was not an expert in the use of force as defined in 11 Del. C. § 464; 2) the question of whether use of force is justified is for the jury; and 3) Dr. Rushing's

[3] *See* DRE 701-703.

presentation of Stephenson's version of events would be prohibited as impermissible hearsay. A21-30. In response, the defense argued that, because Dr. Rushing opined that Stephenson had an ongoing mental illness, it was important for the jury hear about that condition in case Stephenson's self-defense claim failed. A57. In this manner, the defense posited, the jury could still consider whether Stephenson was guilty but mentally ill of Murder First Degree or a lesser murder charge even if Stephenson was denying guilt entirely. A57. The defense further argued that "the trier of fact should be permitted to consider that Defendant might have been acting as a mentally ill paranoid person [] at the time of the conduct charged." A58.

At the hearing on June 9, 2014, the defense expanded its argument, claiming that Dr. Rushing's testimony was relevant because:

> She can give us an insight as to how he would perceive the incident. She would say I don't know whether he acted in self-defense or not, my piece of this is to say how a person in Josh's situation, would that be more likely that he would react that way or not, given this diagnosis. A61.

The State maintained its objection to Dr. Rushing's testimony because, rather than appropriately enlisting Dr. Rushing to support a guilty but mentally ill defense sought to circumvent established evidentiary standard to provide Stephenson's version of events in the absence of his testimony to support a self-defense claim. A63. The defense argued that it wanted Dr. Rushing's testimony

for her diagnosis of major depression, psychosis, and paranoia and would refrain from providing Stephenson's statements to the doctor, in lieu of his testimony. A61-62.

Superior Court issued an oral ruling granting the State's motion to preclude Dr. Rushing's testimony stating:

> Dr. Rushing's report talks about – she does not say anything about his mental state at the time of his – of the alleged shooting and indeed goes sofar [sic] as to say that it's irrelevant in her report. A67

Superior Court supplemented this ruling in its June 20, 2014 Memorandum Opinion. A73-84. The Court properly concluded that Dr. Rushing's testimony would not be helpful to the trier of fact. A73. Nothing in Dr. Rushing's report addressed how Stephenson perceived the events surrounding Ashley's murder. Rather, stating, "[i]f Mr. Stevenson presents a defense of self defense at trial, [his] mental illness is unlikely to be relevant to such a defense," Dr. Rushing disavowed any relation between the incident and his mental illness. A80. Superior Court conclusion was buttressed by two cases, *Commonwealth v. Melone*[4] and *Commonwealth v. Ventura*,[5] in which the defendants advanced arguments analogous to those made by Stephenson here. In both cases, as here, these arguments were rejected. Superior Court was equally unimpressed with the defense fallback position that Dr. Rushing's report was merely a summary that,

[4] 508 N.E.2d 632 (Mass. 1987).
[5] 975 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. 2009).

when developed through her testimony, supports admissibility. A83. Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(d)(1)(c) requires that the substance of the opinions be expressed in the discovery process not during trial, and the report was "devoid of any mention of the defendant's mental capacity on the night of December 24 and its impact on his perception of the events that night." A83. Superior Court properly exercised its discretion when excluding Dr. Rushing's testimony.

Other courts assessing this issue have reached the same conclusion as the Superior Court. In *Melone*, the defendant argued that the trial court should have allowed psychiatric testimony regarding his specific intent to kill and his claim of self-defense.[6] The trial court determined that the psychiatric opinion had little to contribute to the question of intent to kill.[7] The appellate court found that the psychiatrist's opinion did not shed light on the defendant's capacity to form criminal intent, rather simply described defendant as a violent person the summer that he committed the murder and therefore was not relevant.[8]

Similarly in *Ventura* the defendant who claimed self-defense in a murder prosecution. The trial court refused to allow him to present a forensic psychologist's testimony of his mental background to show that he did not act with

[6] 508 N.E.2d at 635.
[7] *Id* at. 637.
[8] *Id.* at 636.

intent to kill because he did not have a history of hostile behavior.[9] On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's ruling and agreed that while psychiatric testimony is admissible to show a defendant's *bona fide* belief that he was in imminent danger at the time of the crime for purposes of establishing self defense, the psychologist's report did not provide his state of mind at the time of the crime, but only his life history and current psychological presentations.[10]

Moreover, in *Commonwealth v. Rivera*,[11] appellant, who was convicted of murder first degree, argued that the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to present, as part of his imperfect self defense theory, psychiatric evidence that he suffered from paranoid delusional disorder.[12] The trial court granted the State's motion to preclude the evidence because Rivera's proffered psychiatric report was insufficient to support that theory.[13] The court stated, "[w]hile [the psychiatrist] determined at the time of the shooting, Rivera suffered from paranoid delusional disorder and paranoid personality type, he fails to indicate if or how these disorders affected him on that date."[14] Moreover, the court concluded, "the psychiatrist" [did] not opine that Rivera's disorder had a specific effect on this state of mind at the time of the shooting, nor does he conclude that

[9] 975 A.2d at 1140.
[10] *Id.*
[11] 2015 WL 6965867 (Pa, Super., Jun. 18, 2015).
[12] *Id.* at *2.
[13] *Id.* at *3.
[14] *Id.* at *5.

any mental disorder cause a *bona fide* belief that he was in danger or otherwise."[15]

Here, Dr. Rushing's psychiatric opinion, like those offered by the experts in *Mellone, Ventura* and *Rivera* shed little, if any, light on Stephenson's state of mind at the time he killed Ashley. In fact, she found that his "mental illness is unlikely to be relevant to such a defense." A42. Dr. Rushing's determination that Stephenson was in a manic state on Christmas Eve 2012 [A41] did nothing to alter that conclusion. Rather, she opined that Stephenson's mental illness was not relevant to a claim of self defense and offers no opinion that his mental disorder caused a *bona fide* belief that he was in danger or otherwise.

Justification Use of Force in Self-Protection Jury Instruction

Stephenson argues that because the chief investigating officer was unable to state exactly what happened between Ashley and Stephenson, "it was possible and plausible that Stephenson acted in self-defense" and Superior Court should have provided the jury a Justification – Self Defense instruction. Op. Brf. at 12-13. Stephenson contends that he has no evidentiary burden to advance a claim of self-defense but, rather, the State must disprove it in the first instance as part of its case in chief. Op. Brf. at 14. Stephenson misapprehends the law and is otherwise incorrect.

[15] *Id.*

Title 11, Section464 of the Delaware Code provides (in relevant part):

> (a) The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion.
>
> (b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity thereof under the circumstances as the person believes them to be when the force is used, without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which the person has no legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action.
>
> (c) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.

This justification defense may be argued to the jury if "the court [was] satisfied that some credible evidence supporting the defense has been presented."[16] There was none presented here. In *Gutierrez v. State*, the defendant was indicted for Assault in a Detention Facility after repeatedly punching a correctional officer.[17] At trial, Gutierrez testified that he punched the officer after the officer stabbed him in the hand with a pen.[18] The jury found him guilty of the lesser-included-offense of Assault Third Degree.[19] Gutierrez appealed arguing that Superior Court erred in denying him a jury instruction on justification.[20] This

[16] *Gutierrez v. State*, 842 A.2d 650, 652 (Del. 2004) (citing *Lunnon v. State*, 710 A.2d 197, 199 (Del.1998).
[17] 842 A.2d at 651.
[18] *Id.*
[19] *Id.*
[20] *Id.*

Court reversed Gutierrez's conviction, finding that Superior Court should have provided the jury with a self-defense instruction because Guitierrez testified to a version of events that, if true, entitled him to a self-defense instruction.[21] Specifically, the Court stated:

> We hold that the evidence presented by a defendant seeking a self-defense instruction is "credible" for purposes of Title 11, Section 303(a) if the defendant's rendition of events, *if taken as true*, would entitle him to the instruction.[22]

In *Gutierrez*, this Court discussed the definitition of the word "credible" stating that "[c]redible" can be defined as "*[c]apable* of being believed."[23] Once the judge determines that the evidence describes a situation in the realm of possibility and it would legally satisfy the requirements of self-defense, he should submit the self-defense question to the jury.[24] "The instruction may be denied only if the trial court can say, *taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the accused*, that no hypothetical reasonable jury could find the fact as the accused suggests."[25]

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[21] *Id.* at 652.
[22] *Id.*
[23] *Id.* at 653 (citing The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 341 (unabridged ed. 1966) (emphasis added)).
[24] *Id.*
[25] *Id.* (citing *Anderson v. State*, 571 So.2d 961, 964 (Miss. 1990) (emphasis added).

While a defendant is not generally required to present a defense, Stephenson acknowledges that a defendant must present some credible evidence of self defense to receive the relevant justification instruction. Here, Stephenson presented no credible evidence of self-defense. Indeed, he presented no evidence of self-defense at all. Rather, he sought to premise the instruction on speculation. He now attempts to fault Superior Court for the absence of evidence because Superior Court denied Dr. Rushing's testimony and report, but as stated previously, Dr. Rushing's testimony was properly excluded.[26]

In *Fetters v. State*,[27] appellant was found guilty of Murder Second Degree for beating his father to death. On appeal, he argued that Superior Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense.[28] Fetters proffered that the trial record was replete with credible evidence of self defense, including: 1) his poor relationship with his father; 2) expert psychological testimony that the defendant perceived his father as "abusive, domineering restrictive and punitive," 3) expert testimony stating defendant claimed to be having a hallucination that the victim was saying "filthy things" about him; and 4) the fact that the victim had

[26] To the extent Stephenson insinutates that Dr. Rushing's report would have been admitted into evidence including his statements to her, as stated above, counsel agreed at the June 9 hearing that Dr. Rushing would not testify regarding his statements and therefore, those statements would not have been admitted, nor would they have been admissible in lieu of Stephenson's testimony.
[27] 436 A.2d 796 (Del. 1981).
[28] *Id.* at 797.

tried to eject Fetters from the house on the night of the homicide. This Court was unpersuaded and affirmed the trial court, holding:

> [Fetters] offered no evidence to show that the victim was the initial aggressor. Defendant also failed to introduce any evidence to establish the quantum of force, if any, used against him by the victim. Defendant presented no evidence on the question of whether he believe that deadly force was necessary to protect himself from the victim. In short, defendant failed to establish by credible evidence each element of self-defense by deadly force.[29]

Like *Fetters*, Stephenson failed to present credible evidence warranting a self-defense jury instruction. Superior Court did not err in denying Stephenson's request.

[29] *Id.* at 798.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court should be affirmed.

/s/ Maria T. Knoll
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Date: March 21, 2016

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE

VS.

JOSHUA C STEPHENSON

Alias: See attached list of alias names.

DOB: [redacted]1985
SBI: 00449406

CASE NUMBER:	CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBER:
1212015998A	PN13-01-0407
1212015998B	MURDER 2ND(F)
	LIO:MURDER 1ST
	IN13-01-0408
	PFDCF(F)
	IN13-01-0409
	PFBPP PABPP(F)
	IN13-01-0411
	ENDANG WLF CHLD(M)

COMMITMENT
ALL SENTENCES OF CONFINEMENT SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVE
LIFE SENTENCE

SENTENCE ORDER

NOW THIS 17TH DAY OF JUNE, 2015, IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT THAT:

The defendant is adjudged guilty of the offense(s) charged. Costs are hereby suspended. Defendant is to pay all statutory surcharges.

AS TO PN13-01-0407- : TIS
MURDER 2ND

Effective December 25, 2012 the defendant is sentenced as follows:

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for the balance of his/her natural life at supervision level 5

AS TO IN13-01-0408- : TIS
PFDCF

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 10 year(s) at supervision level 5

Ex. A

STATE OF DELAWARE
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DOB: [redacted]1985
SBI: 00449406

- Pursuant to 11 Del.C.4204(K), the level 5 shall be served without benefit of any form of early release.

AS TO IN13-01-0409- : TIS
PFBPP PABPP

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 15 year(s) at supervision level 5

- Suspended after 10 year(s) at supervision level 5

- For 2 year(s) supervision level 4 DOC DISCRETION

- Suspended after 6 month(s) at supervision level 4 DOC DISCRETION

- For balance to be served at supervision level 3

- Hold at supervision level 5

- Until space is available at supervision level 4 DOC DISCRETION

AS TO IN13-01-0411- : TIS
ENDANG WLF CHLD

- The defendant is placed in the custody of the Department of Correction for 1 year(s) at supervision level 5

- Suspended for 1 year(s) at supervision level 3

Probation is concurrent to criminal action number IN13-01-0409 .

SPECIAL CONDITIONS BY ORDER

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
JOSHUA C STEPHENSON
DOB: [redacted]1985
SBI: 00449406

CASE NUMBER:
1212015998A
1212015998B

Have no contact with the victim(s) Myron Ashley, Sr , the victim's family or residence.

Pursuant to 29 Del.C. 4713(b)(2), the defendant having been convicted of a Title 11 felony, it is a condition of the defendant's probation that the defendant shall provide a DNA sample at the time of the first meeting with the defendant's probation officer. See statute.

Defendant is to take all medications and comply with all treatment recommendations made by a licensed practitioner caring for defendant.

Defendant shall successfully complete anger management, counseling, treatment program.

Have no drugs/alcohol during period of sentence unless medically prescribed.

NOTES

JUDGE JOHN A PARKINS JR.

FINANCIAL SUMMARY

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
JOSHUA C STEPHENSON
DOB: [redacted]1985
SBI: 00449406

CASE NUMBER:
1212015998A
1212015998B

SENTENCE CONTINUED:

TOTAL DRUG DIVERSION FEE ORDERED	
TOTAL CIVIL PENALTY ORDERED	
TOTAL DRUG REHAB. TREAT. ED. ORDERED	
TOTAL EXTRADITION ORDERED	
TOTAL FINE AMOUNT ORDERED	
FORENSIC FINE ORDERED	
RESTITUTION ORDERED	
SHERIFF, NCCO ORDERED	
SHERIFF, KENT ORDERED	
SHERIFF, SUSSEX ORDERED	
PUBLIC DEF, FEE ORDERED	
PROSECUTION FEE ORDERED	
VICTIM'S COM ORDERED	
VIDEOPHONE FEE ORDERED	4.00
DELJIS FEE ORDERED	4.00
SECURITY FEE ORDERED	40.00
TRANSPORTATION SURCHARGE ORDERED	
FUND TO COMBAT VIOLENT CRIMES FEE	60.00
SENIOR TRUST FUND FEE	
AMBULANCE FUND FEE	
TOTAL	108.00

LIST OF ALIAS NAMES

STATE OF DELAWARE
VS.
JOSHUA C STEPHENSON
DOB: [redacted]1985
SBI: 00449406

CASE NUMBER:
1212015998A
1212015998B

JOSHUA STEPHENSON
JOSHUA STEVENSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, being a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Delaware, hereby certifies that on March 21, 2016, she caused the attached document to be served electronically via Lexis/Nexis File and Serve upon:

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Esq.
Office of the Public Defender
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Wilmington, DE 19801

/s/ Maria T. Knoll
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